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What Turns the Taxman On?
Audit Opinion and Tax Return Adjustments in a Voluntary Audit Environment
Abstract
Using a large proprietary data set obtained from the Finnish Tax Administration, we examine the
factors that trigger adjustments by the tax authority to the taxable income reported by around
25,000 small private companies in their tax returns. After controlling for tax aggressiveness and
other relevant factors, we find that having a voluntary audit with an unqualified audit opinion
decreases the likelihood of the tax authority not accepting taxable income as reported. At the same
time, it moderates the otherwise significant positive effect of tax aggressiveness on the likelihood
of tax authority making adjustments.
Keywords




What Turns the Taxman On?
Audit Opinion and Tax Return Adjustment in a Voluntary Audit Environment
1. Introduction
Conflicts of interest, information asymmetry and the problem of moral hazard that are inherent in
any principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) certainly apply to the relationship
between the tax authority and the taxpayer. Due to the taxpayer’s accountability to the tax
authority, the latter is a quasi-shareholder of companies of all sizes. “The state, thanks to its tax
claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all corporations”
(Desai et al., 2007: 592). The need to prepare financial statements for tax purposes arises from a
company’s accountability to the tax authority and the latter’s need for information in order to
determine the company’s annual taxable income with sufficient accuracy. For small private
companies with little or no external funding, the tax authority is likely to be the primary principal
to whom the owner-manager is accountable. Indeed, for the majority of small private companies,
the main function of financial reporting may be entirely fiscal. In such cases, the credibility of the
financial information is the main issue for the tax authority. “It is important to recognize that tax
authorities are not interested in improving financial reporting quality per se. The effect on
financial reporting quality is a by-product of the tax authorities’ interest in the accurate reporting
of taxable income” (Hanlon et al., 2014: 138). Nevertheless, the monitoring role of tax authorities
and the factors related to financial reporting credibility (or fair presentation) from their perspective
offer an opportunity to explore the reporting behaviour of small private companies.1
1 According IAS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements (IASB, 2014: paragraph 15), financial
statements “shall present fairly the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of an
entity”, and ISA 700 (Revised), Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements
(IAASB, 2015: paragraph 10) “The auditor should form an opinion on whether the financial
3
Applying the agency-theoretical framework to small private companies, the tax authorities are in a
situation where they receive (1) no information, i.e. information asymmetry prevails (no voluntary
audit), (2) good news (unqualified opinion), or (3) bad news (qualified opinion) regarding the
credibility of the financial statements. Consequently we address the following research question:
What are the factors that influence adjustments by the tax authority to the taxable income reported
in a voluntary audit environment? In particular, we seek to provide evidence on the effect of
voluntary audit and audit opinion on the likelihood of tax adjustments in small private companies
below the audit exemption threshold. Small private companies are not only of economic
importance to the many small and medium-sized accounting practices that service their needs, but
they are also important at macro-level. For example, in the EU, 98 percent of businesses are small
and provide 48 percent of jobs (EC, 2013b). They are considered the key to ensuring economic
growth, innovation, job creation, and social integration’ (EC, 2016). In Finland, small firms play
an important role in the economy by contributing 35 percent of turnover and 48 per cent of
employment (The Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2015).  We expect that our research findings
on the economic implications of voluntary audit on taxation can be extended to other countries,
within or outside EU, with voluntary audit of small companies. Extensions to other countries may
also shed light on whether different (higher) thresholds for voluntary audit have differing effects
on tax authorities’ reactions.
In general, the literature on the credibility of financial reporting from the tax authority’s
perspective is somewhat limited. While Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) extensive review of the
literature identifies four broad areas of relevant tax research, we are not aware of any study that
statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial
reporting framework."
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has examined the credibility of financial reporting and auditing from the tax authority’s
perspective, despite its inherent importance.2 We are aware of only two3 prior studies that examine
the tax authorities’ responses to firms’ tax reporting behaviour. First, using tax return data
confidentially4 obtained from the U.S. IRS for about 1,500 firm-years over the period 1982-1992,
Mills (1998) documents that tax adjustments by the IRS (as measured by the amount of adjusted
revenue) are positively associated with the firms’ tax aggressiveness (as measured by the book-tax
difference).5 Second, Cho et al. (2006) reports similar findings using internal data obtained from
the New Zealand Inland Revenue for 81 tax audit cases during 1991-2000. In addition to
differences in the national settings, the study by Cho et al. (2006) differs from Mills (1998)
because the data are not confined to manufacturing firms, but extend across a number of
industries, thus providing a more diverse sample.
A key advantage of using tax return data is that it permits the use of a direct measure of taxable
income, which is difficult to estimate from publicly available financial statement data (Graham
and Mills, 2008). Similar to Mills (1998) and Cho et al. (2006), our study is based on a proprietary
data set obtained from the Tax Administration. However, our data contains the entire population of
around 25,000 small private companies in Finland6 that reported a positive net income for 2011
and were exempt from the statutory audit. More importantly, our unique set of confidential data
2 The areas of tax research identified by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) are: (1) the informational
role of income tax expense reported for financial accounting, (2) corporate tax avoidance, (3)
corporate decision-making including investment, capital structure, and organizational form, and
(4) taxes and asset pricing.
3 It is likely that the main reason for the dearth of research in this area is that data are not readily
available
4 Other studies use confidential tax return data, but examine different questions, and these include
Plesko (2004), Lisowsky (2010) and Beck and Lisowsky (2014).
5 As 71 percent of the firms analysed by Mills (1998) were public companies, her study focused on
the opposite end of the size continuum to the present study.
6 Companies in the financial services sector were excluded.
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allows us to examine the response of the tax authority to the companies’ tax reporting practices as
it includes (1) the complete tax returns submitted by these companies for 2011, (2) the status of
their financial statement audit at the time of filing the return, and (3) any adjustments to taxable
income made by the Finnish tax authority. In addition, our data set allows us to control for several
other fundamental characteristics of the companies not examined in previous studies.
Unlike Mills (1998) and Cho et al. (2006), we restrict our analysis to small private companies. In
the European Union (EU), Member States can exempt small, non-publicly accountable companies
below a certain threshold from the statutory audit. In Finland, the size tests are lower than the EU
maxima and audit exemption is only given to very small private companies. However, in contrast
to many other jurisdictions, all companies in Finland, regardless of size, are required to prepare
annual financial statements, which are attached to the tax declaration, which must be filed with the
tax authority no later than four months after the balance sheet date. The annual financial
statements are automatically sent from the tax office to the company register electronically.
Therefore, we are able to document for the first time in the literature any effect that voluntary
audit and the associated audit opinion have on the tax authority’s propensity to make adjustments
to the taxable income reported by the company. At the same time, our confidential tax return data
allows us to control for the effect of the company’s tax aggressiveness using the difference
between non-taxable revenues and non-tax deductible expenses as claimed in the company’s tax
return.
After controlling for tax aggressiveness and other relevant factors, we find that having a voluntary
audit with an unqualified audit opinion decreases the likelihood of the tax authority not accepting
taxable income as reported. At the same time, it moderates the otherwise significant positive effect
of tax aggressiveness on the likelihood of tax authority making adjustments. However, we do not
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find statistically significant support for our hypothesis that having a voluntary audit with a
qualified audit opinion would increase the likelihood of tax authority not accepting taxable income
as reported. The main results are insensitive to whether the full sample is used or a balanced
sample based on propensity score pairing of tax-adjusted companies with their non-adjusted
counterparts. This study contributes to the emerging literature on the tax authority’s role in
monitoring financial reporting quality. It is the first to document the effect of voluntary audit on
tax return adjustments and whether the tax authority’s response is associated with a qualified or
unqualified audit opinion.
Our proprietary data obtained from the Finnish Tax Administration provides us with details of the
taxable income reported by the population of small private companies in their tax returns, together
with the auditors’ opinion if the company has a voluntary audit. As we include a measure of tax
aggressiveness in the analysis, we are able to use the book-tax difference reported by the company
in its tax return. Conventional measures of tax avoidance used in previous studies are based on
publicly available data, such as effective tax rates or book-tax differences computed from
published financial statements (see Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Unlike prior related studies that
use indirect measures of tax aggressiveness (Mills, 1998; Cho et al., 2006), our direct measure is
free from bias and noise because it is based on the difference between non-taxable revenues and
non-tax deductible expenses, as claimed in the company’s tax return. By analysing whether our
measure of tax aggressiveness predicts the response of the tax authority (i.e. adjusting the taxable
income reported by the company) and whether a voluntary audit and the audit opinion affects the
tax authority’s response, we contribute to the emerging literature (cf. Hanlon et al., 2014) on the
tax authority’s role in monitoring financial reporting quality.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our institutional
setting (Finland) and go on to develop our hypotheses in section 3. The data and model used in
empirical tests are explained in section 4 and we report out results in section 5. In the final section
we draw conclusions.
2. Institutional setting
The institutional setting for this study is Finland, which joined the EU in 1995 and is bound by the
requirements of all EU Directives. At the time of the study, the Fourth Company Law Directive
(78/660/EEC)7 was in force and required limited liability entities to prepare and register annual
accounts, which must be audited by one or more persons entitled to carry out such audits.
However, since 1994, Member States have been able to offer audit exemption to qualifying small
entities. In general, the company must satisfy at least two of the three size criteria for two
consecutive years, up to the EU maxima shown in Table 1, although national jurisdictions can set
lower thresholds. Audit exemption was introduced in Finland by the Auditing Act 2007 and
exemption has been an option for very small companies since 2008 (see Table 1).
Although small companies are audit exempt, they are still required to register their articles of
association with the Finnish Patent and Registration Office where they are placed on the public
record. The articles of association state whether an exempt company will opt for voluntary audit.
The annual report and accounts must be sent to the Finnish Tax Administration within four months
of the company’s reporting year-end and the tax authority then forwards them to the Finnish
7 Accounting Directive (EC, 2013a) revised, repealed and consolidated the Fourth and Seventh
Company Law Directives. It also raised the EU maxima for medium and small reporting entities
and introduced a new category of micro-entities. At the time of the study, the new Accounting
Directive had not been incorporated in Finnish company law.
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Patent and Registration Office where they are available to the public. The majority of all Finnish
limited liability companies (58 percent in our matched-paired sample) submit their tax return by
the end of April because their corporate year-end is the same as the calendar year-end. Any tax
adjustments are made when the final taxable income for the fiscal year is confirmed by the tax
authority, which will be within ten months of the company filing its tax return. The information in
the financial statements placed on the public record excludes the breakdown of taxable and non-
taxable revenues as well as the tax deductible and non-tax deductible expenses that the company
provides solely for the Finnish Tax Administration.
Under the Finnish Companies Act 2006, reporting entities must present their audited financial
statements to shareholders at the annual general meeting within six months of the year-end.
Therefore, the annual general meeting may take place after the tax return has been submitted. For
some companies, this may mean that the planned voluntary audit has not been completed by the
time they submit their tax return. However, the tax authority will know from the tax return filings
whether the audit has already been completed or whether it is still forthcoming. This prevents
companies receiving a qualified audit report from getting round it by changing their policy to audit
exemption.
Finland provides an appropriate setting for this study of small private companies for three reasons.
All limited liability companies in Finland, regardless of size, are required to file a copy of the full
income statement and balance sheet at the public register. In addition, since 2008, small
companies in Finland meeting certain size tests have been exempt from mandatory audit, but may
choose to have their accounts audited on a voluntary basis. Finally, Finland is characterized by a
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relatively high financial-tax alignment (Kasanen et al., 1996; Eberhartinger, 1999)8. Unlike many
other jurisdictions, all Finnish companies are also required to file their full financial statements
(irrespective of whether they have been audited) with the tax authority when submitting their tax
returns. In Finland, taxable income is derived from the net income reported in the official financial
statements. Deductibility in tax returns requires prior recognition in the financial statements
because the Finnish Business Tax Law (EVL 1968/360) § 54 (1976/1094) requires expensing in
financial statements as a prerequisite for tax deductibility.
3. Hypothesis development
3.1 Voluntary audit and tax adjustments
The link between voluntary audit and tax adjustments rests on the assumption that voluntary
auditing of financial statements has a positive effect on the credibility (or fair presentation) of the
financial statements leading to less need for tax authorities to make adjustments. Therefore, we
expect that voluntary audit of financial statements will have an impact on the likelihood of the tax
authority making tax adjustments.
A number of studies provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship between audit and the
quality of financial statements. For example, Dedman and Kausar (2012) examine a large sample
of UK private companies and find that those opting for voluntary audit receive significantly higher
8 According to Eberhartinger (1999), there are two different approaches to the relationship
between tax accounts and financial accounts in Europe: (1) accounting rules and fiscal (tax) rules
are independent of one another, and (2) taxation depends on financial reporting. In the latter
approach, all entries in the books are relevant for taxation. Eberhartinger notes that while the
former approach can be found mainly in Anglo-American countries, the latter approach prevails in
most European jurisdictions, including Finland. As Atwood et al. (2010: note 22) point out, the
close tie between tax and book numbers in Germany applies to single entity company accounts,
not to group accounts as examined by Atwood et al. This close tie is also present in Finland and
our sample comprises single entity companies only.
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credit scores than those that file audit exempt accounts. Their results show that unaudited accounts
are associated with less conservative financial reporting and this explains why such companies
earn higher profits and yet receive lower credit ratings. Results of a study by Höglund (2014),
based on a sample of some 500 Finnish micro-companies choosing audit exemption, are consistent
with Dedman and Kausar (2012) regarding the effect of audit on earnings quality.
However, auditors’ conservatism may work against external auditing being a positive signal to the
tax authority. Kim et al. (2003) note that both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer
income-decreasing accrual choices and are, therefore, not in conflict (see also Fortin and Pittman,
2007). Consistent with this, Kim et al. (2003) find that higher quality audit firms are more
effective in deterring or monitoring income-increasing accruals but less effective in monitoring
income-decreasing accruals. In a similar vein, Scott (2009: 213) draws the following conclusion:
“Anticipating the investor’s loss asymmetry, the auditor reacts by being conservative. When
current value has decreased, writing assets down to current value benefits the investor… by
avoiding the utility loss… [and] thereby decreasing the likelihood of the investor suing the
auditor.” Because tax authorities are likely to be aware of the external auditors’ tendency towards
accounting conservatism leading to lower taxable income for the period, it is not obvious that
external auditing always decreases the likelihood of tax adjustment. Nevertheless, given the
empirical evidence from the studies mentioned above, and assuming that the audit report is
unqualified (thereby providing no cause for concern regarding financial statement credibility), we
posit that opting for voluntary audit reduces the likelihood of tax adjustments by the tax authority.
In contrast, we expect a qualified audit report to have an opposite effect. Our expectation is based
on prior empirical studies that document a negative relationship between audit report qualification
and the quality of financial statement information. For example, the results of studies in the US
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(Francis and Khrishnan, 1999) and China (Chen et al., 2001) are consistent with the notion that the
likelihood of a qualified audit report increases with earnings management.9 Regarding small
companies, however, there are presumably less incentives of upward earnings management due to
predominantly one level of hierarchy as compared to large companies with several hierarchical
levels and thus concerns about loss of control. Indeed Abdel-Khalik (1993: 35) notes that “In a
small company with one level of hierarchy, the owner (manager) controls operations primarily by
means of direct supervision and personal observation.” In a very small company where ownership
and management is not separated, the incentive to earnings management may be income
decreasing rather than income increasing because of tax considerations.10
Assuming that the tax authority is aware of these relationships, we posit that a qualified audit
report will be seen as a negative signal, thereby increasing the likelihood of tax adjustments. To
summarize, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Compared to non-audit, a voluntary audit leading to an unqualified (qualified) opinion
decreases (increases) the likelihood of tax adjustments by the tax authority.
9 This relationship may not be robust across jurisdictions. For example, Tsipouridou and Spathis
(2012) report that in Greece the size of the audit firm (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), as well as the audit
opinion qualification, is not related to management’s opportunistic behavior (earnings
management). The authors attribute this to the institutional context of Greece, which is
characterized by the strong economic bonding of auditors and clients, low investor protection,
weak enforcement mechanisms, and low litigation and reputation costs for auditors. Nevertheless,
an earlier study based on Greek data (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) shows that low audit effort
(measured by audit hours) increases the extent to which companies are able to report aggressively
high earnings.
10 For example, to minimise the owner-manager’s total tax burden (s)he has incentive to record
personal expenses to the company’s books to obtain tax deductibility.
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3.2 Moderating and intensifying effects of voluntary audit
As discussed above, the auditor’s opinion may have an effect on the likelihood of tax adjustment
by the tax authority. In addition to this direct effect, the audit opinion may have an indirect effect,
interacting with the degree of tax aggressiveness11 of the firm. Given that the tax authority will
pay more attention to the tax return when book income diverges significantly from taxable income
(Hoopes et al., 2012; Lennox et al., 2013), it follows that being tax aggressiveness increases the
likelihood of tax adjustments. Consistent with this, Mills (1998) and Cho et al. (2006) provide
evidence that adjustments made by the tax authority increase when the excess of book income
over taxable income increases, supporting the view that firm’s tax aggressiveness increases the
likelihood of tax authorities’ adjustments.
Voluntary audit may moderate the impact of the firm’s tax aggressiveness. Therefore, in addition
to a direct effect, it may have an indirect effect on the likelihood of tax adjustments. As a
professional accountant, the auditor is an expert not only in accounting and auditing, but also in
taxation. Therefore, he or she is able to advise the owner-manager on technical details12, such as
what constitutes deductible expenses and non-taxable income (Niemi et al., 2012; Ojala et al.
2016). Owner-managers of small companies, who do not hire an auditor, may not have this
knowledge and this may result in the company being overly aggressive by attempting to report
non-deductible expenses as deductible and taxable income as non-taxable. As the tax authority is
aware of this, an unqualified audit report is likely to moderate the positive impact of tax
11 Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010: 131), we define a tax aggressive firm as a company that
is aggressive for tax reporting purposes and takes actions to lower reported taxable income, while
keeping book income unchanged (see section 4.2 and Appendix 1).
12 Auditors of small companies in Finland are expected to possess the knowledge needed for small
company taxation. This is tested as part of the Finnish CPA examinations. Also, auditors have to
annually report to the Auditing Board of Finland on how they have been keeping their knowledge
up-to-date.
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aggressiveness on tax adjustments. Therefore, among highly tax aggressive companies, those with
unqualified audit reports are less likely to attract the attention of the tax authority.
In accordance with H1, which suggests a negative relationship between an unqualified audit report
and tax adjustments, we hypothesize that an unqualified audit report moderates the positive impact
of tax aggressiveness on these adjustments. We expect the opposite effect with a qualified opinion.
In conclusion, we posit our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: An unqualified (qualified) opinion from a voluntary audit moderates (intensifies) the
positive impact of tax aggressiveness of a firm on the likelihood of tax adjustments by
the tax authority.
3.3. Effect of a forthcoming voluntary audit
In addition to improving financial statement credibility via the auditor’s examination of the
accounts and potential detection of misstatements in financial reports, an audit may serve as a
signal in itself (Titman and Trueman, 198613). Consistent with this, Lennox and Pittman (2011)
found that after the removal of mandatory audit for small companies in UK, companies that
continued to have an audit on a voluntary basis improved their credit scores (signaling value),
while those choosing audit exemption experienced a decrease in their credit scores (assurance
effect). Consequently, even a forthcoming voluntary audit (an audit that has been announced in the
company’s tax return, but which has not been completed yet) can be regarded by the tax authority
as a positive signal and decrease the likelihood of tax adjustments. However, indicating a
13 Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a theoretical model in which an entrepreneur with
favorable information about his/her firm’s value is able to signal that to the market by hiring a
higher-quality auditor. The idea that auditor choice serves as a signal is applicable to the choice of
being voluntarily audited.
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forthcoming audit in the company’s tax return may be seen as a sign that the audit has revealed
problems that have delayed completion of the audit, especially if peer companies have completed
their audits by the date of the tax return. Therefore, a forthcoming audit might also be seen as a
negative sign and thus increase the likelihood of tax adjustments. In addition, a forthcoming audit
could have an indirect effect, as it might be perceived by the tax authority as leading to a more
accurate tax return, thereby moderating the positive impact of tax aggressiveness on the likelihood
of tax adjustments. Therefore, it is possible that announcing a forthcoming audit in the tax return
either intensifies or moderates the effect of tax aggressiveness on the likelihood of attracting the
attention of the tax authority.
As we have sufficient grounds to expect that a forthcoming audit can convey a positive or a
negative signal to the tax authority, we leave it to our empirical data to show us the direction of
any effect. Based on these lines of reasoning, we formulate our third and final hypothesis as
follows:
H3: A forthcoming voluntary audit has an impact on the likelihood of tax adjustments by
the tax authority.
Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses on the effects of voluntary audit and tax aggressiveness on
the likelihood of attracting the attention of the tax authority.
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4. Data and empirical model
4.1 Data and sample selection
We obtained proprietary data for all limited liability companies in Finland that submitted tax
returns for 2011 and had sales revenue not exceeding 10 million euros. The data include financial
statement information, tax return details, the audit status and any adjustment to taxable income
made by the tax authority. This confidential information was obtained from the Finnish Tax
Administration under the Real Time Economy Program, the aim of which is to improve the flow
of financial information between Finnish companies, their stakeholders and other interest groups
by the adoption of XBRL (see Eierle et al., 2014).14 The data delivery agreement prevents us from
revealing the exact number of tax adjustments, which we refer to as ‘ntax-adjusted ’. This does not
affect the results of the statistical tests, our ability to communicate them to the reader or our ability
to draw conclusions.
The initial list comprised 100,803 companies. After removing all financial institutions, companies
exceeding the size thresholds for voluntary audit, a reporting period other than 12 months,
negative after-tax net income or missing data for variables in the analysis, the final sample
comprised 24,802 companies (see Table 2). Of these, a non-trivial number of companies (ntax-
adjusted ) had their 2011 tax returns adjusted by the tax authority and the remaining companies
(24,802- ntax-adjusted ) did not.
14 The Real Time Economy Program is a national program in Finland with a track-record of
successful development projects in the field of financial reporting and administration. The XBRL
project was supervised by the Real-Time Economy advisory board, which comprised
representatives of the Bank of Finland, the Tax Office, the Ministry of Employment and the
Economy, the Federation of Finnish Enterprises and other national institutions. The advisory
board also benefitted from the participation of system integrators, the Association of Accountants,
and representatives of the Aalto University School of Business.
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As our sample is asymmetric in respect of the treatment (tax adjusted) and control (non-adjusted)
companies, we apply the propensity score matching procedure to identify a non-tax adjusted pair
for each of the companies for which the tax authority adjusted the taxable income. In identifying
the one-to-one pairs, we use our control variables (explained below) excluding tax aggressiveness
as criteria in the propensity score matching15. We base our tests on our full sample with 24,802
observations and nearest-neighbour matching of each tax-adjusted observation firm to a non-
adjusted matched pair. We apply matching with replacement because this "produces matches of
higher quality than matching without replacement by increasing the set of possible matches"
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006: 140). The procedure estimates the selection model with common
support and satisfies the balancing property. The results are reported in section 5.
4.2 Regression models
To control for the effects of potential endogeneity16 between voluntary audit choice and tax
aggressiveness on our results, we apply the Heckman two-stage modelling approach to test our
hypotheses. To start, we estimate the following first stage probit model for voluntary audit
choice:17
( = 1) = 	
√
∫ /                                                    (1)
where
15 The reason for leaving the variable measuring tax aggressiveness out from propensity score
matching is that this variable has not only the role of control variable but is also used as test
variable in interactions terms as explained below.
16 For endogeneity and possible solutions for it in accounting research, see Larcker and Rusticus
(2010) and Lennox et al. (2012).
17 Heckman (1979) suggests that a probit model is more appropriate than a logit model for this
purpose.
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= 	 + 	 + 	 + +
+ + 	 + +
+ + + +
+ +
The dependent variable in this first stage model is VOLAUDIT which is coded 1 if the firm
chooses to have voluntary financial statement audit in year 2011 for fiscal year 2010, and 0
otherwise. The independent variables in the model are derived from the determinants of audit
choice (voluntary audit or exemption) documented in prior literature (see Chaney et al., 2004;
Lennox et al., 2012; Niemi et al., 2012; Dedman et al., 2014; Ojala et al., 2016). Based on that
evidence, we use the following variables on the right hand side of equation 1 (all variables except
STICKYNESS refer to fiscal year 2010): logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS); logarithm of net
sales (LNSALES); asset turnover (ASSETURN); total liabilities divided by total assets
(LEVERAGE); current ratio (CURRENTRATIO); return on assets (ROA); a binary variable
(NEWISSUE) which is coded 1 if there has been a share-issue or the amount of long-term debt has
increased by 5 percent or more, and 0 otherwise; accounts receivable divided by total assets
(RECASSETS); inventories divided by total assets (INVASSETS); a binary variable (NEWFIRM)
which is coded 1 if the firm has been established after 2009, and 0 otherwise; a binary variable
(STICKYNESS) which is coded 1 if the firm has opted for voluntary audit for fiscal year 2009, and
0 otherwise; net sales in year 2010 divided by net sales in 2009 (GROWTH); and a binary variable
(GROUPCO) which is coded 1 if the firm is a parent company or a subsidiary in a group, and 0
otherwise. Based on prior literature mentioned above (Chaney et al., 2004 and Dedman et al.,
2014, among others), we expect positive signs on the coefficients of all variables apart from
ASSETTURN and ROA, where we expect negative coefficients.
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We augment the model with a measure of the company’s tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR) that we
define in equation 3. The inclusion of this variable allows us to control for the possibility that the
choice of voluntary audit and the level of tax aggressiveness are endogenous and will be correlated
if they are both determined by the company.  We do not predict the sign for the coefficient of
TAXAGGR.18
Finally, we control for industry fixed effects by including binary industry indicators INDUSTRYj (j
= 1, …, 9) for nine of the ten main industries in our sample.19
After estimating equation 1, we proceed to estimate equation 2 as our main (second stage) logit
model:
( = 1) = 		                                               (2)
where
= 	 	 + + + + ( × ) +
( × ) + ( × ) + +
+ + + + +
+ + + ∑
18 Based on Hanlon et al. (2014), tax aggressiveness could also be positively associated to having a
voluntary audit.
19 None of the control variables considered in related prior studies (Mills, 1998 and Cho et al.
2006) are relevant to our small private company context. These include the firm’s listing status,
foreign source taxable income, net plant property and equipment measuring intangible assets such
as patents, software and R&D.
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Table 3 shows the variables in the analysis. In the regression model (2), TAXADJ is the dependent
variable and is coded 1 if the tax authority has made an adjustment to the taxable income reported
for fiscal year 2010, and 0 otherwise.
Test variables
Our test variables are AUDITUN, AUDITQU, and AUDITFO which denote voluntary audit with an
unqualified opinion, voluntary audit with a qualified opinion, and a forthcoming voluntary audit
(announced, but not yet completed) of the financial statements of the firm for fiscal year 2010,
respectively.
We test H1 that a tax return accompanied by an unqualified audit report is less likely to be tax-
adjusted with AUDITUN. This indicator variable is coded 1 if the company has a voluntary audit
with unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise. We expect a negative sign for its coefficient (b1).
Correspondingly, AUDITQU is an indicator coded 1 if the auditor’s opinion is qualified, and 0
otherwise. Our H1 suggests a positive coefficient for it (b2). We test our H3 that a forthcoming
audit has an impact on the likelihood of tax adjustments with AUDITFO. It is an indicator variable
coded 1 if the company announces a forthcoming voluntary audit in its tax return, and 0 otherwise.
We do not predict the sign of its coefficient (b3).
To test whether a voluntary audit that has already taken place moderates or intensifies the effects
of tax aggressiveness, we use the interaction variables AUDITUN*TAXAGGR and
AUDITQU*TAXAGGR. H2 suggests that the coefficient of the former interaction (b4) will be
negative, whereas it predicts that the coefficient of the latter interaction (b5) will be positive.
Finally, to see whether a forthcoming voluntary audit modifies or intensifies the relationship
20
between tax aggressiveness and tax adjustments, we use the interaction variable
AUDITFO*TAXAGGR. Based on H3, we do not predict the sign of its coefficient (b6).
Control variables
Our primary control variable is TAXAGGR representing the company’s tax aggressiveness for
which we expect a positive coefficient (b7). Since there is no universal gauge of tax
aggressiveness,20 we use tax return data confidentially obtained from the tax authority to create the
following measure that captures tax aggressiveness of small companies in our institutional setting
without bias and noise.
= 	 	 		 		 	 	
	
                           (3)
where Non-taxable revenues and Non-tax deductible expenses are as claimed by the firm in its tax
return submitted in 2011 for fiscal year 2010. 21
Unlike prior studies that measure the tax aggressiveness of large multinationals from publicly
available data, our measure is based on proprietary data and provides a direct measure of tax
aggressiveness in small private companies. In essence, our measure describes the book-tax
difference that the company reports in its tax return to the tax authority. The idea behind our
20 For a summary of different measures of tax avoidance or tax aggressiveness, see Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010: 137-144).
21 For details of our measure of tax aggressiveness, see Appendix 1.
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measure is that a tax aggressive company trying to minimize its tax burden seeks ways to
maximize non-taxable revenues and minimize non-tax deductible expenses in its tax return. To
account for size differences, we use total revenue (the sum of net sales and other revenue) instead
of total assets as the size deflator. We do this for two reasons: (1) taxation is based on the
company’s revenues (and expenses), not on its assets, and (2) in the case of small private
companies, total revenue is likely to be a more valid indicator of the company’s size and level of
activity. For example, it is not uncommon that very small private companies with assets are
relatively inactive and, therefore, generate little taxable income; others may be dormant with no
taxable revenue.
We augment our logit model (2) with a number of controls. First, PAPERFILING is a binary
variable coded 1 if the company has chosen to file its tax return in traditional paper format, and 0
if it has chosen the digital filing option. Our expectation is that paper tax returns are more prone to
calculation errors and hence tax adjustments compared with digital tax returns where the
calculations are performed by the software. In addition, most small private companies outsource
financial statement preparation and filing to external professional accountants. Therefore, the
likelihood of using digital tax filing can be assumed to increase with the size of client base and
technological competence of the accountant. Small private companies submitting their tax returns
in paper format are less likely to be experienced in accounting and less likely to use professional
accountants, thus increasing the probability of adjustments by the tax authority due to increased
proclivity for errors. Therefore, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient (b8).
Second, PETTYCASH is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has petty cash on hand (rather
than cash in bank), and 0 otherwise. Very high petty cash balances may indicate weaknesses in the
internal control and administration of the company. They may also signal a heightened risk of
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fraud or misappropriation of the company’s assets. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient
(b9).
Third, if tax adjustments are a proxy for lack of financial statement credibility, it is reasonable to
expect that tax adjustment is correlated with other quality measures, such as earnings
management. We control for its effect with EARNMGT which measures abnormal working capital
accruals as defined by DeFond and Park (2001).22 We expect a positive sign on the coefficient
(b10).
Fourth, it can be assumed that apart from serial entrepreneurs, the directors of newly established
companies are likely to be less experienced in preparing financial statements and tax returns than
directors of older companies. To control for the potential effect of firm age, we add NEWFIRM,
which is an indicator variable coded 1 if the company was established after 2009, and 0 otherwise.
We predict a positive sign on its coefficient (b11).
Fifth, we control for firm performance using ROA which is the return on assets, defined as the sum
of earnings before interest, taxes and salaries divided by total assets,23 and financial leverage with
22 For measuring earnings management, we employ the DeFond and Park (2001) model for its
parsimony (no parameter estimation required) and focus on working capital accruals. The latter are
likely to be more relevant than non-current accruals for earnings management in small private
companies. However, we also employ the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) and the
Kothari et al. (2005) model as robustness checks on the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of
earnings management model.
23 For measuring ROA, we compute the nominator before salaries to account for the possibility a
director of a small company may pay dividends to him/herself through an abnormally large salary
or pay his/her salary through abnormally large dividends, depending on his/her position in
personal taxation.
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LEVERAGE which is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets.24 Following prior studies,
which suggest that earnings quality increases with firm performance and decreases with financial
leverage (see Dechow et al. 2010), and assuming that tax adjustments made by the tax authority
reflect earnings quality, we expect the likelihood of the adjustments to be negatively related to
ROA and positively related to LEVERAGE. This implies a negative sign for the coefficient (b12)
and a positive sign for the coefficient (b13) for these variables, respectively.
Sixth, although company size is likely to capture aspects of agency relationships,25 it may also
have an impact on the likelihood of tax adjustments. The rationale for this is that, all things being
equal, the tax authority is likely to allocate its resources to audits of larger rather than smaller
companies because of the potential for larger tax collections from larger companies. Size is also an
indicator of the company’s complexity, potentially giving rise to adjustments by tax authority. To
measure company size we use LNSALES, which is the natural logarithm of net sales for the fiscal
year. We predict its coefficient (b14) to be positive.
Seventh, to control for potential endogeneity arising from the possibility that firm tax
aggressiveness and the choice of voluntary audit (but not the audit opinion) is jointly determined
by the management of the firm, we include INVMILLS (the inverse Mills ratio) as a control
variable (see Lennox et al., 2012).  This ratio is obtained from our first stage probit model for
voluntary audit choice (equation 1).
24 Due to extreme values of LEVERAGE, we winsorize it at the 95 percent fractiles of the
distribution.
25 For the relation between organizational structure and the demand for auditing in the small
private companies, see Abdel-Khalik (1993). For the importance of agency relationships in small
company context, see Collis (2012), Niemi et al. (2012) and Ojala et al. (2016).
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5. Results
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used to test our hypotheses.
The table reports the p-values from the t-tests for differences between companies in the full
sample that were subject to tax adjustments and those that were not (column 1 versus column 2),
as well as for differences between companies in the full sample that were subject to tax
adjustments and their PSM (propensity score matched) pairs that were not (column 1 versus
column 3).
Consistent with H1, the t-tests indicate a significant difference in the likelihood of the company
having an unqualified audit opinion (AUDITUN) between the subsequently tax-adjusted and non-
adjusted companies. For example, while the proportion of companies with an unqualified audit
opinion is >0.222 among the total sample of non-adjusted companies, the corresponding
proportion is <0.222 among the tax-adjusted companies.26 The difference is significant (p=0.001).
The differences in the likelihoods of companies having a qualified audit opinion (AUDITQU) and
companies announcing a forthcoming audit (AUDITFO) remain insignificant between tax-adjusted
and non-adjusted companies, irrespective of whether the full or the PSM sample is analysed27.
In addition, the t-tests for our measure of tax aggressiveness suggest that companies subjected to
tax adjustments are, on average, significantly more tax aggressive than those not subjected to
adjustments (see the mean values for TAXAGGR in columns 1 and 2). The difference is highly
26 To preserve confidentiality, we are unable to report these means precisely (see the legend in
Table 4).
27 The comparisons of variables other than AUDITUN, AUDITQU and AUDITFO between tax-
adjusted and non-adjusted companies in our PSM sample could be expected to show insignificant
differences since none of them was used as a criterion variable in the propensity score matching of
non-tax adjusted companies with their tax adjusted counterparts.
25
significant (p<0.001) in the full and PSM sample (column 1 versus column 2 and column 1 versus
column 3).
In our full sample, Table 4 also shows significant differences between the tax-adjusted and non-
adjusted firms (column 1 versus column 2) in terms of their tendency to file their tax returns in
paper format rather than digital filing (PAPERFILING) and in terms of being a newly established
company (NEWFIRM). Consistent with our expectation, the means of both these variables are
larger in tax-adjusted companies than in non-adjusted companies. In the matched-paired sample,
the statistically significant differences of these variables disappear. If we use non-parametric
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (see Armstrong et al., 2010) rather than parametric t-tests in the
comparisons reported in Table 4, the results and conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged.
Tables 5A and 5B show correlation matrices for the variables estimated from the full and
matched-paired samples respectively. These tables present Pearson correlations below the
diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. From Table 5A (the full sample) we can
see that a tax adjustment by the tax authority (TAXADJ) has a significant Pearson correlation with
the following variables: AUDITUN (p=0.004), AUDITQU (p=0.020), TAXAGGR (p<0.001),
PAPERFILING (p=0.001), and NEWFIRM (p=0.005) and all have expected sign. The Spearman
correlations yield similar results. The corresponding results for correlations estimated from the
matched-paired sample reported in Table 5B show that an unqualified opinion from a voluntary
audit (AUDITUN) is negatively correlated with adjustments by the tax authority (TAXADJ).
However, corresponding correlations with AUDITQU and AUDITFO are insignificant.
The results from estimating our first stage probit model for voluntary audit choice (equation 1) are
shown in Appendices 2A and 2B. For 9 of the 14 independent variables included in the model, the
26
estimated coefficients are significant at 10% level or better, and show the expected signs
(Appendix 2). A noteworthy exception is TAXAGGR, for which the estimated coefficient (0.001)
is far from significant (p=0.973). This result is consistent with the view that the choice of
voluntary audit and tax aggressiveness are not jointly determined by the company. Despite this
finding, we include INVMILL (the inverse Mills ratio) obtained from this first stage probit model
in our second stage logit model to control for the potential effect of endogeneity. Regarding the
overall fit of our audit choice model, the concordance index of 0.794 shows that the model has a
fairly good explanatory power for voluntary audit choice in our full sample of nearly 25,000
observations.
Our main test results from estimating the second stage binary logit model (equation 2) are reported
in Tables 6A and 6B for the full and matched-paired (PSM) samples respectively. Table 6A (the
full sample with 24,802 observations) shows that, after controlling for other relevant factors, the
effect of a voluntary audit accompanied by an unqualified audit opinion (AUDITUN) has a
significant negative effect on the likelihood of the tax authority adjusting the taxable income
reported in the tax return (see the negative coefficient -0.524 with p=0.007 in Table 6A). This
result is in line with H1. In addition, the significant negative regression coefficient28 of the
interaction variable AUDITUN*TAXAGGR (-1.636 with p=0.017) is consistent with H2,
suggesting that an unqualified audit opinion from a voluntary audit moderates the positive impact
of tax aggressiveness on the likelihood of tax adjustments. In contrast, we do not find statistically
significant evidence for our hypotheses that a voluntary audit accompanied by a qualified audit
opinion would increase the likelihood of tax authority’s adjustment either directly (H1) or
28 Mean marginal effect -0.036 with p=0.002.
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indirectly (H2). This is the consequence of the coefficients estimated for AUDITQU and
AUDITQU*TAXAGGR being insignificant when the control variables are included in the model.
With regard to a forthcoming audit announced in the company’s tax return (H3), the results shown
in Table 6A suggest that it has a significant indirect effect as it moderates the positive impact of
tax aggressiveness on the likelihood of tax adjustments (see the negative coefficient -2.788 with
p<0.001 estimated for interaction AUDITFO*TAXAGGR29). This supports the notion that for tax
aggressive companies (with high TAXAGGR), a forthcoming voluntary audit is seen as a positive
rather than a negative signal by the tax authority, thereby reducing the likelihood of attracting
adjustments. However, we do not find evidence of a forthcoming voluntary audit having any direct
effect, as the coefficient of AUDITFO in Table 6A is not significant.
The results in Table 6A show that six of the nine control variables (ignoring industry fixed effects)
have a significant influence on the likelihood of adjustments by the tax authority. These are
TAXAGGR, PAPERFILING, PETTYCASH, NEWFIRM, ROA, and LNSALES. The coefficients
estimated for these variables have the expected positive sign, apart from ROA which has the
expected negative sign. It is notable that the coefficient of INVMILLS (0.022 with p=0.930) which
controls for the potential effect of endogeneity, is far from significant. This suggests that our
results are not biased by tax aggressiveness and the choice of voluntary audit being jointly
determined by the company.
Finally, the overall statistics reported in Table 6A for the second stage logit regression with a
significant Wald Chi-Square of 430.4 and a pseudo R2 of 0.163 indicate that our model is able to
29 Mean marginal effect -0.027 with p=0.043.
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explain tax authority’s behaviour to some extent. This is also supported by the concordance index
of 0.818, which indicates that the model predicts the tax authority’s responses (adjustment versus
no adjustment) to taxable income reported by the companies correctly in approximately four out of
five cases.
The main findings from the matched-paired sample with 2 ntax-adjusted observations30 in Table 6B
are consistent with those from the full sample in Table 6A. A voluntary audit with an unqualified
audit opinion (AUDITUN) has a significant negative effect (p=0.004 and p=0.006) on the
likelihood of triggering attention from the tax authority.  In addition, the negative coefficient31 (-
12.600) of the interaction AUDITUN*TAXAGGR (p=0.003) when the control variables are
included, indicates the moderating effect of a voluntary audit with an unqualified opinion. Once
again, these results are in line with H1 and H2. With regard to qualified audit opinion and the
announcement of a forthcoming audit, the results from the matched-paired sample shown in Table
6B are insignificant32.
Table 6B also shows that the coefficients of six of the nine control variables are insignificant. This
is expected because all control variables were used as criteria in the propensity score matching of
non-tax adjusted companies with their adjusted counterparts.  Overall, the insignificance of most
control variables in Table 6B thus suggests that the matching procedure has been effective.
30 2 ntax-adjusted refers to the number of observations in the matched-paired sample where each tax-
adjusted observation is matched with a non-tax adjusted observation.
31 Mean marginal effect -0.217 with p=0.028.
32 However, the mean marginal effect -0.217 is not significant (p=0.195).
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Finally, it can be seen that the overall fit of the model in terms of the pseudo R2 (0.470) is higher
than when estimated from our full sample. This is also reflected in the concordance index of 0.870
which indicates that the model fit, in terms of its ability to predict the observations in our PSM
sample, is higher than in the full sample (0.818).
Robustness checks
We perform several additional tests to check the sensitivity of our main results. First, instead of
using our proprietary tax return data for measuring tax aggressiveness, we compute the traditional
book-tax difference from the sample companies’ publicly available financial statement data.  We
calculate the book-tax difference as pre-tax book income less taxable income, estimated by
grossing up the tax expense in the income statement with the statutory tax rate (26%) for the
year.33 Following prior studies, we use total assets as the size deflator. Our expectation is that
when the book-tax difference is computed from income statement data instead of tax return data,
the variable will include more noise as a measure of tax aggressiveness, thereby affecting our
results.
Second, we exclude all companies with a non-calendar fiscal year-end from the sample. The
purpose of this test is to show any effect on our findings due to the year-end rush that both
financial statement auditors and tax authorities experience soon after 31 December. This is due to
the fact that the majority of companies use the calendar year as their financial reporting year,
which could have an adverse effect on the quality of the auditor’s and tax authority’s work, and
thus affect our results.
33 For a review of the different measures of tax aggressiveness (tax avoidance), see Hanlon and
Heitzman, 2010.
30
Third, we check whether our main results are affected by the inclusion of companies making a loss
in the sample. It is reasonable to suspect that unprofitable companies are less motivated to show
tax aggressiveness with the aim of avoiding taxes. This is because usually a loss-making company
does not have to pay income tax for the year in question (assuming that its final taxable income is
also negative). However, under the loss carry-forward system (where losses are tax deductible in
subsequent years), loss-making companies may still have an incentive to show tax aggressiveness.
Nevertheless, we would expect this incentive to be moderated for two reasons: first, because the
tax effect is not immediate and second, because the tax savings are conditional on the company
being profitable in subsequent years. Overall, we have sufficient grounds to expect that when loss-
making companies are included in the sample, they are likely to detract from the significance of
our main results.
For each of these tests, we re-estimate our logit model (with all control variables) from our full
sample. The number of observations available in model estimations varies across the tests, as non-
calendar year companies are excluded in the second test and loss-making companies included in
the third test. The results of these three logit regressions are shown in Table 7.
The robustness test shown in column 1 of Table 7 highlight the importance of the availability of
our confidential tax return data for our main findings. This is indicated by the fact that when our
tax aggressiveness measure is replaced with the book-tax difference computed from publicly
available income statement data as explained above, it has a dramatic deteriorating effect on the
overall model fit (the pseudo R2 falls from 0.163 in Table 6A to only 0.023 in column 1 of Table
7). In line with this, the coefficient of TAXAGGR (with p=0.999) is no longer significant, nor is the
coefficient estimated for its interaction with AUDITUN. Nevertheless, the coefficient of
AUDITUN is significant (-0.505 with p=0.003). Unlike in Table 6A, however, the AUDITQU now
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has a significant positive coefficient (with p=0.041) which is consistent with H1. In conclusion,
the results indicate the significance of our proprietary data for the main findings documented in
this study on the relationships between voluntary audit, tax aggressiveness and the credibility of
financial reporting from the tax authority’s perspective.
Column 2 in Table 7 suggests that, in terms of pseudo R2 (0.177), the overall model fit is not
affected very much by excluding (approximately 10,000) companies with non-calendar fiscal
years from the sample. While the negative coefficient of AUDITUN is still significant (p=0.031),
the coefficient of its interaction with TAXAGGR is not (p=0.149). In contrast, the interaction
AUDITFO*TAXAGGR still has a significant negative coefficient (p<0.001), as was the case in
Table 6A. Finally, excluding companies with non-calendar fiscal years does not detract from the
significance of the effect of tax aggressiveness to any material extent (see the coefficient 6.222
with p<0.001). Overall, it can be concluded that the year-end rush effect that both financial
statement auditors and tax authorities experience does not provide grounds to change our
conclusions concerning the effects of voluntary audits and firm tax aggressiveness on the
likelihood of tax authority’s adjustments.
When loss-making companies are included in the sample (see column 3 in Table 7), we find that,
in addition to tax aggressiveness, only the interaction effect of voluntary audit with an unqualified
audit opinion is significant (with p=0.067), while the main effect is not. Nevertheless, the low
pseudo R2 (0.036) is consistent with our expectation that including loss-making companies in the
sample introduces a lot of noise in the data, thereby deteriorating significantly the overall fit of the
model and reducing the reliability of the results.
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In addition to the robustness tests discussed above, we re-estimate our main logit model with all
control variables (equation 2) from our full sample using the method suggested by Firth (1993).
The purpose of this additional test is to control for the possibility that a separation would be
present in our data which might cause problems in fitting the model. 34 The (untabulated) results
from this Firth logit estimation were close to those reported in Table 6A, with only minor
differences in relevant statistics. For example, the Wald chi-square of the estimated model was
433.7 with p<0.001 and the pseudo R2 had the value of 0.166, which are almost the same as in the
original estimation reported in Table 6A (430.4 with p<0.001 and 0.163, respectively.) Also, the
estimated regression coefficients of the model were virtually the same with almost identical
significance level as those shown in Table 6A. Thus, it can be concluded that our results are
insensitive to whether the original maximum likelihood estimation or the Firth logit estimation
controlling for potential separation in the data is used. Following Lo (2014), we complement our
logit model with a linear probability model (untabulated). We do so to examine potential issues
with the inference. Again, we find no indication of data separation. The signs and statistical
significance of the hypothesis variables remain similar to the logit model.
Finally, we also checked the robustness of our findings with regard to our definition of earnings
management. Instead of using the model suggested Defond and Park (2001) for measuring
abnormal current accruals, we estimated the residuals for total accruals using the modified Jones
model as suggested by Dechow et al., (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). The results (not tabulated)
34 Firth logit (see Heinze, 2002) is based on a penalized likelihood method that is appropriate in
samples where a separation may occur. This may be the case when the dependent (response)
variable may have low response prevalence and/or when the model includes several categorical
interaction variables, thereby leading to some combination of predictors having the same event
status.
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showed that our findings and conclusions are insensitive to this choice of measuring earnings
management.
6. Conclusions
Using a large proprietary data set from the confidential records of the Finnish tax authority for the
fiscal year 2011, we examine the importance of voluntary audit (for small company audit-exempt
financial statements) and the audit opinion as determinants of the tax authority’s  adjustments to
the taxable income reported by around 25,000 small private companies in their tax returns. We
contribute to the literature by providing evidence on both the direct and indirect effects of external
audit as follows.
First, after controlling for tax aggressiveness and other relevant factors, we find that having a
voluntary audit with an unqualified audit opinion decreases the likelihood of tax adjustments (a
direct effect). At the same time, it moderates the otherwise significant positive effect of tax
aggressiveness (an indirect effect) on the likelihood of the tax authority making adjustments. This
study is the first to provide such evidence, as prior studies examining adjustments made by tax
authorities in other jurisdictions have not considered the effects of audit or audit opinions. Thus,
our paper develops a new perspective on the importance of voluntary audit in small private
companies. However, we do not find statistically significant support for our hypothesis that having
a voluntary audit with a qualified audit opinion increases the likelihood of the tax authority not
accepting taxable income as reported. The main results of our study are qualitatively insensitive to
whether the full sample is used or a balanced sample based on propensity score pairing of tax-
adjusted companies with their non-adjusted counterparts. Finally, robustness tests suggest that,
with some exceptions, the results are qualitatively unaffected by the use of different size deflators
for tax aggressiveness or excluding companies with non-calendar fiscal year-ends.
34
Second, the proprietary tax return data available for this study allows us to measure tax
aggressiveness directly using the book-tax difference reported in the companies’ tax returns. Thus,
we are able to avoid the noise inherent in book-tax differences measured with publicly available
data, such as loss carry-forwards and other adjustments to the final taxable income for the period.
We contribute to the emerging literature on the role of tax authorities in monitoring financial
reporting quality by documenting that tax aggressiveness, when measured directly from the tax
return, has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of the tax authority’s response, and
voluntary audit with an unqualified audit opinion mitigates the likelihood of that response. Our
robustness tests confirm that our results are indeed sensitive to measuring tax aggressiveness
directly from confidential tax return data rather than publicly available financial statements.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature by documenting for the first time the positive
effects of some context-specific factors on the likelihood of the tax authority making tax
adjustments, such as filing the tax return in paper format rather than online, and whether there is
cash on hand rather than in bank. The use of such variables is new to the literature and may be
useful to future studies examining the financial reporting quality of small companies.
We use a two-stage model to control for the effects of potential endogeneity arising from the
possibility that firm tax aggressiveness and the choice of voluntary audit (but not the audit
opinion) is jointly determined by the management of the firm. The results of our first stage
regression model shows that in our small private company setting, the choice of voluntary audit
and the level of tax aggressiveness are not jointly determined. Therefore, we can be confident that
the relationship between tax authority’s behaviour and audit opinion is not driven by a spurious
correlation attributable to endogeneity.
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The findings of this study have implications that will be of interest not only to creditors and the
accountancy profession but especially the owner-managers of small private companies. For
example, the empirical results reported in this paper suggest that the likelihood of the tax authority
making tax adjustment for a non-tax aggressive company is only 1.11%.35 In contrast, if the
company shows a high level of tax aggressiveness in its tax return by claiming e.g. that 90% of its
total revenues are non-taxable dividend income from domestic companies while all its expenses
are tax deductible, the likelihood of tax adjustment increases to 15.08%.36  However, by opting for
a voluntary audit, and assuming that the audit opinion is unqualified (which has the probability of
98% for tax aggressive companies in our data), the company can decrease the likelihood of tax
adjustment to 2.49%.37 The decrease of 12.59 percentage points (15.08%-2.49%) reflects the
probability of receiving economic benefits from voluntary audit in the form of tax savings. If the
company considers this likelihood of tax savings to be large enough, it may conclude that a
voluntary audit is worth the money and therefore opts for it.
Our study of  the economic implications of voluntary audit on taxation can be extended to other
countries with voluntary audit of small companies. Research extensions to other countries may
shed light on whether different (higher) thresholds for voluntary audit have differing effects on tax
authorities’ reactions. The results of this study also contribute to the debate on the benefit of
voluntary audit in small private companies and should be of interest to tax authorities and policy
makers in other jurisdictions.
35 See Table 6A. For simplicity, we apply here the estimated logit model without control variables.
When AUDITUN = AUDITQU = AUDITFO = 0 and TAXAGGR = 0, the model yields the
following likelihood for tax adjustment: Prob(TAXADJ=1) = 1/(1+e-(-4.492)) = 0.0111.
36 Prob(TAXADJ=1) = 1/(1+e-(-4.492+3.071*0.9)) = 0.1508.
37 Prob(TAXADJ=1) = 1/(1+e-(-4.492+3.071*0.9-0.398-1.712*0.9)) = 0.0249.
36
Appendix 1. Book-tax difference based on the tax return submitted to the Finnish tax
authority
The calculation below derives from the basic structure of the tax return form used in Finland by all
companies subject to income tax.
A. Net income, as per income statement for the year
+ Tax expense, as per income statement for the year
B. Net income before taxes, as per income statement for the year
+ Non-tax deductible expenses in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return (1)
- Non-taxable revenues in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return (2)
C. Taxable net income, as reported by the firm in the tax return
+/- Adjustments made by the tax authority to non-tax deductible expenses and non-taxable
revenues reported in the tax return
-/+ Other adjustments made by the tax authority (3)
D. Final taxable income for the year
x Statutory tax rate
E. Final income tax
We define our measure of company’s tax aggressiveness as the book-tax difference (B – C)
reported by the firm in the tax return:
B - C
=   B - (B + Non-tax deductible expenses in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return -
Non-taxable revenues in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return)
=   Non-taxable revenues in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return - Non-tax
deductible expenses in the income statement, as claimed in the tax return




(1) Mandatory reserves for future expenditure, depreciation of shares in fixed assets, losses
from mergers, entertainment expenses, fines and penalties paid, etc.
(2) Dividend income from domestic companies, gains from disposals of shares in fixed
assets (under certain conditions), reversals of tax deductible write-downs and reserves, etc.
(3) For example, carry-forwards of losses confirmed in previous years, deducted by the tax
authority ex office.
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Appendix 2. Estimation results of the probit model for voluntary audit choice (equation 1): Full
sample (n=24,802)
Dependent variable:  Prob(VOLAUDIT = 1)
Independ. variables: Exp. sign Coefficient Chi-square p-value
INTERCEPT +/- -2.700 957.56 <.001 ****
LNASSETS + 0.053 80.77 <.001 ****
LNSALES + 0.058 61.55 <.001 ****
ASSETTURN - -0.001 0.06 0.804
LEVERAGE + 0.025 3.11 0.078 *
CURRENTRATIO + 0.004 2.77 0.096 *
ROA - -0.062 32.24 <.001 ****
NEWISSUE + -0.044 0.72 0.397
RECASSETS + 0.000 0.00 0.951
INVASSETS + -0.113 5.46 0.020 **
NEWFIRM + 0.376 23.63 <.001 ****
STICKYNESS + 1.909 5541.66 <.001 ****
GROWTH + 0.000 0.03 0.863
GROUPCO + 0.662 87.69 <.001 ****
TAXAGGR +/- 0.001 0.00 0.973
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Included




The independent variables in this probit regression are the following: LNASSETS is  logarithm of
total assets; LNSALES is logarithm of net sales; ASSETTURN is net sales divided by total assets;
LEVERAGE is total liabilities divided by total assets; CURRENTRATIO is current ratio; ROA is
return on assets; NEWISSUE is a binary variable coded 1 if there has been a share-issue or the
amount of long-term debt has increased 5% or more, and 0 otherwise; RECASSETS is accounts
receivable divided by total assets; INVASSETS is inventories divided by total assets; NEWFIRM is
a binary variable which is 1 if the firm has been established after 2009, and 0 otherwise;
STICKYNESS is a binary variable coded 1 if the firm has opted for voluntary audit in year t-2, and
0 otherwise; GROWTH is net sales in year t-1 divided by net sales in year t-2; GROUPCO is a
binary variable coded 1 if the firm is a parent company or a subsidiary, and 0 otherwise;
TAXAGGR is as defined in equation 3. Statistical (two-tail) significance levels (p-values) better
than 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, and 0.100 are indicated by ****, ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Figure 1. Summary of the hypothesized effects of voluntary audit on attracting tax adjustments
H3: +/-
Voluntary audit with an
unqualified audit report
completed by the time the tax
return is submitted to the tax
Tax aggressive tax return
submitted to the tax authority
(and announcement of any
forthcoming voluntary audit)
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completed after the tax return has
been submitted to the tax authority
Likelihood of attracting




Voluntary audit with a
qualified audit report
completed by the time the tax




Table 1. Audit exemption thresholds in Finland and EU size thresholds
Finnish maxima for
audit exemption
EU maxima for defining
a small company
Turnover €0.2m €8.0m
Balance sheet total €0.1m €4.0m
Average employees 3 50
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Table 2. Sample companies
Number of
companies
Initial data from the tax authority   100,803
Companies with mandatory auditing removed     56,969
Companies with missing data for variables used in hypothesis testing removed       1,548
Companies with negative net income for the sample year removed     17,484
Final sample     24,802
of which: Companies with tax adjustments by the tax authority ntax-adjusted
                Companies with no adjustments by the tax authority 24,802 -  ntax-adjusted
Our data, confidentially obtained from the Finnish Tax Administration, contained all Finnish limited liability
companies that had a sales revenue not exceeding €10 million in 2011.  The number of tax-adjusted firms is
shown as ntax-adjusted in this table to preserve the confidentiality of the data, as agreed with the Finnish Tax
Administration.
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Table 3. Variables in the main logit model (equation 2)
Variable Definition
TAXADJ Binary variable coded 1 if the tax authority has made an adjustment to
the taxable income reported by the firm in its tax return filed in 2011
for fiscal year 2010, and 0 otherwise.
AUDITUN Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has had a voluntary audit
accompanied by an unqualified audit opinion in 2011 for fiscal year
2010, and 0 otherwise.
AUDITQU Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has had a voluntary audit
accompanied by a qualified audit opinion in 2011 for fiscal year 2010,
and 0 otherwise.
AUDITFO Binary variable coded 1 if the firm informs of its forthcoming voluntary
audit in its tax return in 2011 for fiscal year 2010, and 0 otherwise.
TAXAGGR Measure of tax aggressiveness defined as (non-taxable revenues - non-
tax deductible expenses as reported in the tax return)/ total revenues in
2010.
PAPERFILING Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has opted for the submission of its
tax return for 2010 in a paper format (instead of an electronic format)
and 0 otherwise.
PETTYCASH Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has cash on hand at the end of 2010
(rather than cash in bank), and 0 otherwise.
EARNMGT Earnings management in 2010 measured by the Defond-Park (2001)
model.
NEWFIRM Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has been established after 2009, and
0 otherwise.
ROA Return on assets defined by the sum of earnings before interest and
taxes and salaries, divided by the total assets in 2010.
LEVERAGE Total liabilities of the firm divided by its total assets in 2010.
LNSALES Natural logarithm of sales revenue in 2010.
INVMILLS Inverse Mills ratio from the first stage probit model for voluntary audit
choice for fiscal year 2010 (equation 1).
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the main logit model (equation 2)
All firms (1) Tax-adjusted firms (2) Non tax-adjusted firms  (3) PSM non tax-adjusted firms t-tests of subsample differences
n = 24,802 n1 = ntax-adjusted n2 = 24,802 – ntax-adjusted               n3 = ntax-adjusted p-values
Variable Mean  Med Std.Dev. Mean Med Std.Dev. Mean Med Std.Dev.  Mean Med Std.Dev. (1) versus (2)       (1) versus (3)
AUDITUN 0.222 0.000 0.415 <0.222 0.000 0.364 >0.222 0.000 0.416 <0.222 0.000 0.364 0.001 *** <.001 ****
AUDITQU 0.005 0.000 0.074 >0.005 0.000 0.121 <0.005 0.000 0.073 >0.005 0.000 0.121 0.153 0.101
AUDITFO 0.213 0.000 0.409 >0.213 0.000 0.426 <0.213 0.000 0.409 >0.213 0.000 0.426 0.278 0.191
TAXAGGR 0.008 0.000 0.209 >0.008 0.080 1.236 <0.008 0.000 0.146 >0.008 0.080 1.236 <.001 **** <.001 ****
PAPERF. 0.406 0.000 0.491 >0.406 0.000 0.501 <0.406 0.000 0.491 >0.406 0.000 0.501 0.001 *** 0.282
PETTYC. 0.297 0.000 0.457 >0.297 0.000 0.471 <0.297 0.000 0.457 >0.297 0.000 0.471 0.165 0.183
EARNMGT 0.497 0.000 0.500 >0.497 1.000 0.499 <0.497 0.000 0.500 >0.497 1.000 0.499 0.158 0.356
NEWFIRM 0.036 0.000 0.187 >0.036 0.000 0.247 <0.036 0.000 0.186 >0.036 0.000 0.247 0.032 ** 0.875
ROA 0.754 0.415 1.017 <0.754 0.344 0.991 >0.754 0.416 1.018 <0.754 0.344 0.991 0.116 0.827
LEVERAGE 0.571 0.391 0.691 <0.571 0.397 0.640 >0.571 0.391 0.692 <0.571 0.397 0.640 0.319 0.233
LNSALES 10.350 10.71 1.375 <10.35 10.54 1.440 <10.35 10.71 1.374 <10.35 10.540 1.440 0.129 0.742
INVMILLS 0.440 0.596 0.271 0.443 0.603 0.443 0.440 0.596 0.271 0.442 0.595 0.274 0.918 0.415
For variable definitions, see Table 3. The last two columns show the p-values for the t-tests between the following samples: tax-adjusted (1) versus full sample of non-adjusted
firms (2) and tax-adjusted (1) versus PSM-matched sample of non-adjusted firms (3). Before performing the t-tests, we examine the equality of variances and apply either
Satterthwaite (unequal variances) or pooled (equal variances) t-tests. The number of tax-adjusted firms is shown as ntax-adjusted in this table to preserve the confidentiality of the data,
as agreed with the Finnish Tax Administration. For the same reason, we are unable to report the precise mean values for the tax-adjusted and non tax-adjusted firms in columns (1),
(2) and (3). Statistical (two-tailed) significance levels (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, and 0.100 are indicated by ****, ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table 5A. Correlation matrix of the variables in the main logit model (equation 2): Full sample (n = 24,802)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
1. TAXADJ 1.000 -0.018 0.015 0.007 0.169 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.018 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 0.001
0.004 0.020 0.278 <0.001 0.001 0.165 0.158 0.005 0.089 0.200 0.281 0.918
2. AUDITUN -0.018 1.000 -0.040 -0.278 0.003 0.051 -0.014 0.009 0.005 -0.064 -0.093 0.034 0.346
0.004  <0.001 <0.001 0.591 <0.001 0.028 0.137 0.430 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3. AUDITQU 0.015 -0.040 1.000 -0.039 -0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.015 0.022 0.049 0.014 0.044
0.020 <0.001 <.001 0.786 0.236 0.651 0.650 0.021 0.001 <0.001 0.024 <.001
4. AUDITFO 0.007 -0.278 -0.039 1.000 0.001 -0.068 -0.011 -0.004 0.020 -0.026 0.058 0.045 0.307
0.278 <0.001 <0.001 0.871 <0.001 0.076 0.486 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
5. TAXAGGR 0.207 0.043 -0.007 -0.021 1.000 0.096 0.016 0.027 -0.023 -0.211 -0.095 -0.271 0.008
<0.001 <0.001 0.257 0.001  <0.001 0.014 <0.001 0.000 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.207
6. PAPERFILING 0.022 0.051 0.008 -0.068 -0.007 1.000 0.068 0.023 -0.020 -0.103 -0.090 -0.121 -0.002
0.001 <0.001 0.236 <0.001 0.244  <0.001 0.000 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.778
7. PETTYCASH 0.009 -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.007 0.068 1.000 -0.005 0.004 0.007 0.028 0.052 -0.008
0.165 0.028 0.651 0.076 0.241 <0.001 0.391 0.518 0.266 <0.001 <0.001 0.185
8.EARNMGT 0.009 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.023 -0.005 1.000 0.195 -0.036 0.037 0.005 0.008
0.158 0.137 0.650 0.486 0.801 0.000 0.391  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.453 0.218
9. NEWFIRM 0.018 0.005 0.015 0.020 -0.002 -0.020 0.004 0.195 1.000 0.052 0.071 0.122 0.054
0.005 0.430 0.021 0.001 0.713 0.002 0.518 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
10. ROA -0.010 -0.057 0.029 -0.017 -0.008 -0.067 -0.007 -0.045 0.037 1.000 0.143 0.482 -0.098
0.116 <0.001 <0.001 0.009 0.186 <0.001 0.274 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
11. LEVERAGE -0.006 -0.083 0.076 0.054 -0.011 -0.053 0.019 0.017 0.028 0.255 1.000 0.191 -0.023
0.319 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.073 <0.001 0.003 0.008 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001
12. LNSALES -0.010 0.032 0.016 0.043 -0.060 -0.125 0.043 -0.001 0.148 0.264 0.025 1.000 0.122
0.129 <0.001 0.010 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.896 <0.001 <0.001 0.000  <0.001
13. INVMILLS 0.001 0.346 0.044 0.307 0.008 -0.002 -0.008 0.008 0.054 -0.098 -0.023 0.122 1.000
0.918 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.207 0.778 0.185 0.218 <0.001 <0.001 0.000 <0.001
For variable definitions, see Table 3. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are shown below (above) the diagonal.
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Table 5B. Correlation matrix of the variables in the main logit model (equation 2): PSM sample (n1 + n3 = 2 n
tax-adjusted)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
1. TAXADJ 1.000 -0.147 0.063 0.05 0.689 -0.041 0.051 0.036 0.006 -0.005 0.049 0.024 0.014
 <0.001 0.101 0.191 <0.001 0.282 0.183 0.356 0.875 0.904 0.205 0.535 0.714
2. AUDITUN -0.147 1.000 -0.050 -0.277 -0.060 0.093 -0.025 0.028 -0.035 -0.061 -0.126 -0.036 0.270
<0.001 0.195 <0.001 0.121 0.016 0.515 0.469 0.370 0.113 0.001 0.350 <0.001
3. AUDITQU 0.063 -0.050 1.000 -0.050 0.024 0.060 -0.029 0.091 0.040 0.075 0.031 0.006 0.027
0.101 0.195 0.197 0.541 0.121 0.453 0.018 0.300 0.053 0.420 0.875 0.487
4. AUDITFO 0.050 -0.277 -0.050 1.000 0.052 -0.119 -0.023 -0.004 -0.034 0.024 0.065 0.119 0.322
0.191 <0.001 0.197 0.174 0.002 0.555 0.912 0.382 0.528 0.091 0.002 <0.001
5. TAXAGGR 0.211 -0.010 -0.013 0.007 1.000 -0.035 0.057 0.044 -0.010 -0.112 -0.029 -0.183 -0.004
<0.001 0.786 0.730 0.860 0.360 0.136 0.251 0.798 0.004 0.450 <0.001 0.912
6. PAPERFILING -0.041 0.093 0.060 -0.119 -0.053 1.000 0.028 0.070 -0.052 -0.023 -0.100 -0.116 -0.075
0.282 0.016 0.121 0.002 0.172 0.473 0.070 0.179 0.547 0.009 0.002 0.052
7. PETTYCASH 0.051 -0.025 -0.029 -0.023 -0.004 0.028 1.000 0.021 0.010 0.079 0.046 0.127 0.004
0.183 0.515 0.453 0.555 0.923 0.473 0.582 0.793 0.040 0.232 0.001 0.920
8. EARNMGT 0.036 0.028 0.091 -0.004 0.025 0.070 0.021 1.000 0.252 -0.060 0.072 -0.031 0.014
0.356 0.469 0.018 0.912 0.523 0.070 0.582  <0.001 0.121 0.061 0.416 0.710
9. NEWFIRM 0.006 -0.035 0.040 -0.034 -0.016 -0.052 0.010 0.252 1.000 0.010 0.103 0.082 -0.090
0.875 0.370 0.300 0.382 0.678 0.179 0.793 <0.001 0.789 0.008 0.034 0.019
10. ROA 0.008 -0.042 0.037 0.018 0.019 0.005 0.061 -0.057 0.034 1.000 0.070 0.519 -0.060
0.827 0.274 0.338 0.633 0.630 0.899 0.112 0.141 0.384 0.070 <0.001 0.120
11. LEVERAGE 0.046 -0.114 0.021 0.083 -0.006 -0.042 0.052 0.053 0.051 0.170 1.000 0.278 0.012
0.233 0.003 0.580 0.031 0.877 0.277 0.174 0.173 0.189 <0.001  <0.001 0.756
12. LNSALES 0.013 -0.018 0.016 0.118 -0.216 -0.099 0.128 -0.027 0.066 0.305 0.103 1.000 0.290
0.742 0.637 0.676 0.002 <0.001 0.010 0.001 0.488 0.089 <0.001 0.008 <.001
13. INVMILLS -0.031 0.308 0.037 0.292 0.054 -0.035 -0.010 0.078 0.043 -0.049 -0.073 0.103 1.000
0.415 <0.001 0.336 <0.001 0.161 0.362 0.789 0.042 0.260 0.199 0.057 0.007
For variable definitions, see Table 3. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are shown below (above) the diagonal. The number of tax-adjusted firms is shown as ntax-
adjusted in this table to preserve the confidentiality of the data, as agreed with the Finnish Tax Administration.
53
Table 6A. Estimation results of the main logit model (equation 2): Full sample (n = 24,802)
Dependent variable: Prob (TAXADJ = 1)
Independent variables: Exp. Sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value            Mean marginal effect p-value
INTERCEPT +/- -4.492 <0.001 **** <0.001 <0.001 ***
Test variables:
AUDITUN - -0.398 0.024 ** -0.524 0.007 ***
AUDITQU + 0.977 0.062 0.822 0.129
AUDITFO +/- 0.143 0.331 0.124 0.452
AUDITUN*TAXAGGR - -1.712 0.010 ** -1.636 0.017 ** -0.036 0.002 ***
AUDITQU*TAXAGGR + 7.467 0.187 6.956 0.183 0.254 0.166
AUDITFO*TAXAGGR +/- -2.624 <0.001 **** -2.788 <0.001 **** -0.027 0.043 **
Control variables:
TAXAGGR + 3.071 <0.001 **** 6.545 <0.001 ****
PAPERFILING + 0.535 <0.001 ****
PETTYCASH + 0.219 0.083 *
EARNMGT + 0.067 0.583
NEWFIRM + 0.472 0.063 *
ROA - -0.139 0.055 *
LEVERAGE + 0.029 0.761
LNSALES + 0.247 <0.001 ****
INVMILLS +/- 0.022 0.930
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Incl. Incl.
Wald Chi-Square 376.9 <0.001 **** 430.4       <0.001    ****
-2Loglikelihood 3,112.1 3,026.8
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.163
Concordance index 0.809 0.818
See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. Statistical (two-tail) significance levels (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, and 0.100 are indicated by ****, ***,
**, and * respectively.
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Table 6B. Estimation results of the main logit model (equation 2): PSM sample (n1 + n3 = 2 n
tax-adjusted)
Dependent variable: Prob (TAXADJ = 1)
Independent variables Exp. sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value   Mean marginal effect p-value
INTERCEPT +/- -0.533 <0.001 **** -4.663 <0.001 ****
Test variables:
AUDITUN - -0.747 0.004 *** -0.817 0.006 ***
AUDITQU + 1.207 0.334 1.026 0.434
AUDITFO +/- -0.037 0.882 -0.149 0.606
AUDITUN*TAXAGGR - -9.202 0.022 *** -12.600 0.003 *** -0.217 0.028 **
AUDITQU*TAXAGGR + 157.9 0.675 108.700 0.664 13.040 0.643
AUDITFO*TAXAGGR +/- 0.270 0.966 -4.464 0.472 -0.660 0.603
Control variables:
TAXAGGR + 19.369 <0.001 **** 23.392 <0.001 ****
PAPERFILING + 0.074 0.711
PETTYCASH + 0.195 0.360
EARNMGT + 0.120 0.560
NEWFIRM + -0.107 0.799
ROA - -0.141 0.222
LEVERAGE + 0.286 0.081 *
LNSALES + 0.416 <0.001 ****
INVMILLS +/- 0.131 0.757
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Incl.
Wald Chi-Square 74.6 <0.001 **** 98.9       <0.001 ****
-2Loglikelihood 688.5 642.8
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.470
Concordance index 0.865 0.870
See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. Statistical (two-tailed) significance levels (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, and 0.100 are indicated by ****,  ***,
**, and * respectively. The number of tax-adjusted firms is shown as ntax-adjusted in this table to preserve the confidentiality of the data, as agreed with the Finnish Tax
Administration.
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fiscal year excluded from the
sample
Loss-making companies
included in the sample
Independent variables: Exp. sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
INTERCEPT +/- -3.894 <0.001 **** -6.730 <0.001 **** -5.163 <0.001 ****
Test Variables:
AUDITUN - -0.505 0.003 *** -0.598 0.031 ** -0.168 0.183
AUDITQU + 0.998 0.041 ** 0.771 0.341 0.400 0.318
AUDITFO +/- 0.041 0.782 -0.002 0.993 0.139 0.219
AUDITUN*TAXAGGR - 0.007 0.662 -1.224 0.149 -0.041 0.067 *
AUDITQU*TAXAGGR + -0.163 0.722 3.948 0.555 1.206 0.237
AUDITFO*TAXAGGR +/- -0.050 0.569 -3.394 <0.001 **** -0.025 0.306
Control variables:
TAXAGGR + <.001 0.999 6.222 <0.001 **** 0.110 <0.001 ****
Other control variables Included Included Included
Wald Chi-Square      73.1 <0.001 **** 262.4 <0.001 **** 177.2 <0.001 ****
-2Loglikelihood 3,498.8 1,706.9   5,949.3
Pseudo R2   0.023 0.177        0.036
N     24,802      14,739       42,447
a) TAXAGGR is the book-tax difference measured as follows: (Net income + tax expense – Tax expense/Statutory tax rate)/Total assets. The figures
are taken from the company’s publicly available income statement. For definitions of other variables, see Table 3. Statistical (two-tailed) significance
levels (p-values) better than 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, and 0.100 are indicated by ****, ***, **, and * respectively.
